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What’s	Observed	in	a	Rating?	
Rankings	as	Orientation	in	the	Face	of	Uncertainty	
	
Elena	Esposito	and	David	Stark	
	
Abstract:	Ratings	 and	 rankings	 are	 criticized	 for	 being	 simplistic,	 obscurantist,	
inaccurate,	 and	 subjective,	 yet	 they	 are	 becoming	 an	 increasingly	 influential	
social	form.	We	elaborate	the	criticisms	of	ratings	and	rankings	in	various	fields	
but	go	on	to	argue	that	analysis	should	shift	its	target.	The	problem	that	ratings	
deal	with	 is	 not	 observation	 of	 an	 independent	world.	 Instead,	 the	 challenge	
they	 face	 is	 the	 circularity	 of	 second-order	 observation	 in	which	 observations	
must	 take	 into	 account	 the	 observations	 of	 others.	 To	 this	 purpose	 they	
function	well	enough	not	because	they	mirror	how	things	are	but	because	they	
offer	a	highly	visible	reference	point	to	which	others	are	attentive	and	thereby	
provide	 an	 orientation	 to	 navigate	 uncertainty.	 The	 concluding	 section	places	
the	 problem	 of	 ratings	 and	 rankings	 in	 a	 broader	 historical	 perspective	
contrasting	 the	 ranked	 society	 to	 the	 society	 of	 rankings.	 Responding	 to	
uncertainty,	ratings	and	rankings	perpetuate	rather	than	eliminate	anxiety.	
	
INTRODUCTION		
They	are	ubiquitous:	
The	100	Best	Colleges	in	the	US	
The	Top	100	Hospitals		
The	Top	100	Restaurants	in	Edmonton		
Top	100	Songs	of	the	1960s	
Top	100	Movies	of	all	Time	
Top	100	EBooks	Yesterday	
The	World’s	Top	10	Strongest	Democracies	
The	Top	50	Universities	under	50	years	old	
The	Top	100	Pizza	Toppings.		
We	are	surrounded	by	ratings	and	rankings.	Banks	are	rated	for	financial	strength,	
nations	are	rated	for	their	level	of	corruption	(Cooley	and	Snyder	2015),	celebrities	are	
ranked	by	their	bankability,	and	prisons	are	ranked	according	to	performance	standards	
(Mennicken	2016).	Professors	are	rated	by	their	students,	their	articles	hierarchized	by	
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citation	counts,	their	journals	ranked	by	impact	factors,	and	their	disciplines	scored	by	
their	relative	sexiness	(Felton	et	al	2008).	Wines	can	be	ranked	by	their	Parker	score	
(Chauvin	2016),	your	credit	rating	expressed	by	your	FICO	score	(Poon	2007),	and	the	
impact	of	your	online	presence	in	the	social	media	world	measured	by	your	Klout	score	
(Gerlitz	and	Lury	2014).		
	 Some	ratings	and	rankings	have	been	around	for	awhile.	The	controversial	
financial	ratings	agencies,	for	example,	have	been	in	operation	for	about	a	century	
(Langohr	and	Langohr	2008,	pp.	377	ff.).	The	first	blue	book	Michelin	guide	was	issued	in	
August	1900.	Edward	O’Brien	began	editing	his	annual	compilation	of	The	Best	American	
Short	Stories	in	1915.	The	New	York	Daily	News	first	began	grading	movies	on	a	scale	of	
zero	to	three	stars	in	July	1928.	But	if	the	ranked	list	has	a	long	pedigree	(going	back	at	
least	to	Moses’s	stone	tablet	list	of	the	Top	Ten	Prohibitions),	it	is	also	the	case	that	the	
rating	frenzy	is	a	relatively	recent	phenomenon.	The	National	Academy	of	Sciences	
rankings	of	graduate	programs	in	engineering	and	natural	sciences	began	in	1925,	but	
was	primarily	intended	for	academics	(Stuart	1995).	In	fact,	the	craze	over	college	and	
university	rankings	really	began	only	after	US	News	and	World	Report	launched	its	
rankings	in	1983	(Espeland	and	Sauder	2007;	Musselin	2010).	The	spread	of	ratings	and	
rankings	in	many,	very	different	fields	had	a	sharp	acceleration	only	in	the	most	recent	
decades	(Kornberger	and	Carter	2010:	33;	Grewal	at	al.	2008).	For	example,	it	is	only	
since	the	1990s	that	the	financial	ratings	agencies	have	had	a	recognized	and	explicit	role	
in	the	regulation	of	the	banking	system.	At	the	international	level,	53	of	the	prior-
mentioned	82	public	ratings	of	nation	states	identified	by	Cooley	and	Snyder	(2015)	
appeared	since	2001.		
	 While	they	are	becoming	more	and	more	pervasive,	ratings	and	rankings	are	
hugely	controversial	and	very	much	criticized	in	all	areas.	Rating	Agencies	have	been	
charged	with	a	good	part	of	the	responsibility	for	the	recent	financial	crisis:	they	
evaluated	bad,	late,	and	evaluated	the	wrong	things.	University	rankings	still	find	great	
hostility	among	academics,	who	consider	them	stupid,	superficial,	self-interested,	
harmful,	and	unable	to	grasp	the	aspects	really	significant	for	research	and	teaching	
(Espeland	and	Sauder	2007).	The	credibility	of	restaurants	guides	is	doubted	both	by	
chefs	and	by	customers	(Ayeh	et	al	2013)	and	their	effects	are	ambiguous:	the	reference	
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to	reviews	and	rankings	risks	becoming	a	substitute	for	live	interaction	and	thereby	
killing	adventure	in	traveling	(Kugel	2018).	
	 People	know	it	and	complain.	However,	these	tools	continue	to	proliferate	and	
become	increasingly	influential	as	the	web	–	which	seems	to	“think”	in	the	form	of	lists	
(Poole	2013,	Eco	2009)	–	further	contributes	to	the	explosive	growth	of	ratings	and	
rankings	as	well	as	denunciations	of	them	as	misguided.	Rating	Agencies	still	find	buyers	
for	their	reviews,	which	continue	to	be	discussed	in	the	press	and	in	the	mass	media	in	
general	–	even	when	their	indications	are	not	followed	by	traders	(for	example	the	
downgrading	of	France	in	November	2011,	which	was	basically	ignored	by	markets).	
College	rankings,	criticized	and	often	openly	opposed	by	academics,	have	spread	so	
much	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	ignore	them	–	even	at	the	expense	of	the	quality	of	
teaching	and	research.	Parker's	rating	of	wines	serves	as	a	general	reference	for	
everyone,	also	for	those	who	oppose	the	trend	towards	increasing	“parkerized”	wines	
(Chauvin	2014:	90).	As	Cooley	and	Snyder	(2015)	ask	provocatively,	“If	ratings	are	so	
fraught,	why	are	they	so	popular?”		
								This	paper	addresses	that	question,	examining	the	curious	situation	around	the	
explosion	of	ratings	and	rankings	from	a	distinctive	perspective:	We	argue	that	the	
features	for	which	ratings	and	rankings	are	rightly	criticized	are	the	same	mechanisms	
that	underlie	their	effectiveness.	There	are,	of	course,	wide	differences	between	
disparate	phenomena	like	lists	on	the	web,	wine	ratings,	or	university	rankings.1	It	is	not	
by	chance,	however,	that	they	are	spreading	at	the	same	time	and	share	many	formal	
features.2	To	understand	these	phenomena	and	their	presuppositions	beyond	the	
immediate	differences	we	need	a	broader	perspective	that	considers	them	jointly	and	
refers	to	the	underlying	question	they	all	address:	social	complexity	and	efforts	to	cope	
with	it.3		This	requires	abandoning	the	idea	of	reality	mirroring.	As	we	shall	see,	the																																									 																					
1	Not	all	 lists	 are	 rankings;	many	are	not	even	 ratings.	And	not	all	 ratings	are	 rankings.	Ratings	
evaluate	but	do	not	necessarily	compare	their	objects.	Rankings	compare	the	items	and	establish	
a	hierarchy,	while	pure	lists	do	not	evaluate	and	do	not	compare	(Esposito	2017).		
2	As	Espeland	and	Sauder	(2016:	5)	observe,	the	patterns	of	evaluation	and	response	created	by	
university	rankings	are	very	similar	in	different	contexts	subject	to	accountability	metrics.	
3	Note	 on	 terminology:	 To	 avoid	 unnecessary	 repetition	 of	 "ratings	 and	 rankings,"	 except	 for	
passages	when	we	are	explicitly	making	distinctions	between	 ratings	 and	 rankings,	we	use	 the	
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problem	that	ratings	deal	with	is	not	observation	of	an	independent	world	(for	which	
they	are	inevitably	flawed	and	inadequate)	but	the	circularity	of	second-order	
observation	in	which	observations	must	take	into	account	the	observations	of	others.	To	
this	purpose	they	function	well	enough,	not	because	they	inform	us	about	how	things	are	
but	because	they	provide	an	orientation	about	what	others	observe.	It	is	in	regard	to	
problems	of	second-order	observation	that	ratings	and	rankings	are	used,	offering	a	
reference	in	a	contingent	world	with	its	horizon	of	uncertainty.		
	 In	the	section	that	follows,	we	summarize	the	criticisms	of	ratings	and	rankings,	
grouping	these	along	four	major	lines:	1)	Ratings	simplify,	2)	they	are	intransparent,	3)	
they	fail	as	forecasts,	and	4)	they	are	not	objective.	In	the	subsequent	section,	we	
introduce	an	alternative	perspective	from	which	to	analyze	ratings	and	rankings,	
elaborating	that	framework	in	the	next	section	by	revisiting	these	four	features.	In	the	
concluding	section	we	place	the	problem	of	ratings	and	rankings	in	a	broader	historical	
perspective	contrasting	the	ranked	society	to	the	society	of	rankings.		
BERATING	THE	RANKINGS	
	 Ratings	and	rankings	are	criticized	in	every	field,	from	universities	to	hospitals,	
from	wines	to	finance.	The	complaints	are	remarkably	similar	across	fields	and	can	be	
grouped	along	four	basic	contours.4	
1.	Ratings	and	rankings	simplify.	
	 Ratings	offer	a	one-dimensional	quantitative	measure	(Karpik	2007:	331)	that	
brutally	reduces	the	qualitative	complexity	of	phenomena	and	disregards	their	local,	
cultural,	and	social	contexts	(Cooley	and	Snyder	2015;	Jeacle	and	Carter	2011:	297;																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																							
terms	 interchangeably	 in	 this	 paper.	 Our	 object	 of	 study	 is	 the	 general	 social	 form	 of	 the	
evaluative	list.		
4	Espeland	 and	 Sauder	 (2016:	 ch.2)	 also	 identify	 four	mechanisms	 at	 the	 base	 of	 the	 power	 of	
rankings:	 commensuration,	 self-fulfilling	 prophecies,	 narrative,	 and	 reverse	 engineering.	While	
their	 analysis	 partly	 coincides	 with	 ours	 in	 underlining	 the	 performative	 effects	 of	 evaluation	
(discussed	below),	Espeland	and	Sauder	refer	their	four	mechanisms	to	the	"reactivity"	activated	
by	 rankings.	 For	us	 instead,	as	we	will	 argue,	 reactivity	 itself	 is	a	 consequence	of	 second-order	
observation.	What	interests	us	here	is	to	highlight	the	characteristics	of	rankings	that	make	such	
observation	 possible	 and	 to	 identify	 the	 first-order	 perspective	 from	 which	 criticisms	 are	
formulated.		
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Kornberger	and	Carter	2010:	328).	In	the	financial	field	they	fail	to	take	into	account	the	
many	dimensions	of	risk	(Levich	et	al.	2002:	13);	in	the	oenological	field	they	reduce	taste	
to	a	variety	of	sensory	measures;	and	in	the	academic	field	they	flatten	the	different	
approaches	of	colleges	onto	a	single	plane,	erasing	distinctive	options	(for	example,	
moral	or	religious	choices)	and	additional	offerings	(tutoring,	counseling,	basic	research)	
that	do	not	fit	the	ratings’	evaluative	metrics.	The	ranking	of	prisons	in	the	UK	aggregates	
in	a	single	number	very	disparate	dimensions	such	as	number	of	escapes,	educational	
effectiveness,	resource	management,	and	telephone	answering	time	(Mennicken	2016),	
even	though	some	of	them	can	be	at	odds	with	each	other	–	an	effective	educational	
program	for	inmates,	for	example,	might	not	be	compatible	with	a	reduction	in	the	
number	of	escapes.		
	 Quantification	integrates	information	but,	in	so	doing,	reduces,	simplifies,	and	
decontextualizes	knowledge,	thereby	rendering	many	components	irrelevant	while	
imposing	a	singular	form	to	all	the	rest	(Espeland	and	Sauder	2007:	17).	The	problem	
with	a	rating	begins	from	the	moment	it	is	expressed	in	a	number,	one	that	is	larger	or	
smaller	than	the	one	attributed	to	the	other	evaluated	objects.	It	is	this	number	form	
that	facilitates	comparison.	Or,	stated	more	forcely,	as	some	critics	suggest	(Espeland	
and	Stevens	2008),	it	is	this	number	form	that	forces	comparison.5		
	 The	simplicity	of	quantification	masks	the	fact	that	ratings	are	built	around	
disparate	and	incommensurable	principles	of	evaluation.	It	must	be	such	because	every	
scientific	article,	every	organization,	every	wine,	strictly	speaking	every	object,	is	unique	
and	different	from	every	other	one.6	In	many	cases,	ratings	are	created	without	the	
intention	of	comparison.	In	such	cases,	ratings	begin	with	scores.	In	classic	guides	like	
Michelin,	originally	the	various	features	of	restaurants	were	dealt	with	separately:																																									 																					
5	See	Stark	(2011)	on	the	tendency	for	ratings	to	become	rankings.	There	are	exceptions,	as	in	the	
case	 of	 the	 rating	 of	 prisons	 in	 England	 (Mennicken	 2016),	 but	 they	 refer	 to	 ratings	 used	 for	
administrative	purposes	rather	then	for	public	orientation.		
6	In	 a	 fascinating	 study,	 Kreiner	 (2010)	 examines	 these	 problems	 in	 the	 case	 of	 architectural	
competitions.	 The	 conceptual	difficulties	 spring	 from	 the	 fact	 that	different	projects	 cannot	be	
compared	 because	 they	 do	 not	 offer	 answers	 to	 the	 same	 question.	 The	 various	 teams	 of	
designers	 in	the	competition	each	interpret	the	task	 in	their	own	way.	 Indeed,	they	must	do	so	
because	this	is	part	of	the	creativity	of	their	performance.	The	results	are	then	different	answers	
to	 different	 questions,	 and	 these	 are	 what	 rankings	 (as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 competition)	 should	
order.	
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quality	of	raw	materials	and	preparation,	for	example,	but	also	originality,	atmosphere,	
view,	and	many	other	factors	that	cannot	be	sensibly	aggregated	into	a	single	measure	
(Karpik	2007:	113ff.).	What	these	raw	scores	offer	is	a	multiplicity	of	singular	judgments.	
But,	once	these	are	available,	they	tend,	almost	inevitably,	to	be	put	into	a	comparative	
mode	that	yields	a	rank	order	(Guyer	2010:	124).	From	the	1930s,	the	Michelin	guide	
moved	to	the	aggregate	classification	in	one,	two,	or	three	stars.		
	 Thus,	comparison	emerges	even	if	it	was	not	the	intent	of	those	who	produced	
the	numbers.	From	multifacted	judgments	along	many	dimensions,	the	simplified	results	
are	the	number	of	stars.	From	the	multiplicity	of	scorings	assessing	various	aspects	of	the	
object,	the	institution,	or	the	performance,	there	is	now	a	single	score	which	can	easily	
translate	into	a	position	within	a	ranking.	In	the	current	debate,	it	is	this	transformation	
into	a	ranking	that	is	the	principle	villain.7		
	 The	central	problem,	therefore,	is	that	singularities	are	reduced	to	
comparabilities.	A	ranking	displaces	complexity,	yielding	a	hierarchy	in	which	each	
element	has	a	lower	place	than	the	previous	one	and	a	higher	place	than	the	next	one.	
The	hierarchy	monopolizes	attention.	The	users	of	rankings	look	at	who's	up	and	who's	
down,	not	at	what	it	is.	The	ranking	describes	the	mutual	relations	between	a	number	of	
entities,	and	not	the	performance	of	each	of	them	(Stuart	1995)	-	much	to	the	frustration	
of	the	entities	involved,	who	can	happen	to	make	significant	individual	progress	without	
changing	at	all	the	position	in	the	rankings	(because	in	the	meantime	the	others	also	
moved)	(Cooley	and	Snyder	2015;	Schulz	et	al.	2001:	37).	
	 Several	problems	derive	from	this	reduction	of	singularities	to	comparabilities.	
Among	these,	critics	bemoan	that	comparability	leads	to	competition.	What	was	
supposed	to	be	a	descriptive	measure	to	provide	information	to	the	user	about	the	
object	(e.g.,	the	quality	of	a	university	or	a	restaurant)	tends	to	become	an	assessment	
																																								 																					
7	Let’s	 take	 for	 example	 the	 recent	 alarm	 on	 university	 rankings,	 which	 even	 attracted	 the	
attention	of	the	White	House	(Shear	2014).	In	the	face	of	the	many	dysfunctional	consequences	
of	the	rankings	of	colleges,	it	has	been	proposed	to	replace	the	(uncontrollable,	suspect,	generic)	
rankings	with	a	system	of	ratings,	which	offer	a	series	of	evaluations	on	various	aspects	of	each	
institution,	 without	 aggregating	 them	 in	 an	 overall	 order.	 Ratings	 should	 be	 more	 stable	 and	
controllable,	"driven	by	a	commitment	to	quality,	not	by	an	obsession	with	a	numerical	standard"	
(Policano	2005:	32).		
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that	puts	it	in	competition	with	other	items.	Competition	is	not	a	"natural	fact"	that	
ratings	merely	reflect,	but	rather	a	consequence	of	the	assessment.	Entities	such	as	
cities,	for	example,	before	the	production	of	league	tables	that	assess	and	implicitly	
compare	them,	were	not	"better"	or	"worse"	than	the	others,	but	were	just	as	they	were	
–	with	their	histories,	their	specificities,	and	their	incomparable	features	(Kornberger	and	
Carter	2010).	The	production	of	league	tables	of	cities,	starting	from	the	1980s,	
generated	debate	and	competition	among	them.	This	socially	constructed	competition	
changed	how	cities	were	observed	(both	internally	and	externally)	and	produced	a	series	
of	consequences	in	policy	and	resource	management.	
2.	Ratings	and	rankings	are	intransparent.		
	 Ratings	are	black	boxes.	Who	relies	on	ratings,	as	in	general	on	the	various	forms	
of	audit,	relies	on	an	opinion	(Power	1997:	175;	Langohr	and	Langohr	2008),	without	
really	knowing	upon	what	it	depends	because	the	system	of	ratings	–	ranging	from	the	
structure	of	evaluating	entities,	to	their	evaluation	criteria,	to	their	metrics,	procedures,	
and	algorithms	–	is	substantially	opaque.	The	ownership	and	internal	organizational	
structure	of	the	evaluating	entities,	critics	claim,	are	obscure.	In	some	cases	(for	example,	
in	financial	firms	but	also	for	universities	or	restaurants),	the	metrics,	procedures,	and	
algorithms	used	in	the	evaluation	are	officially	and	explicitly	kept	confidential,	allegedly	
to	avoid	manipulation	by	the	rated	entities.	Where	ratings	rely	on	experts,	criteria	are	
not	disclosed	lest	they	lose	their	privileged	status	(Blank	2007:	8).8	Moreover,	in	many	
cases	the	work	of	evaluators	requires	the	availability	of	confidential	information	
provided	by	companies,	such	as	budgets,	forecasts,	contingent	risks	analyses,	and	
information	relating	to	new	financings,	acquisitions,	dispositions	and	restructurings	–	and	
this	confidentiality	is	respected.	
	 The	lack	of	transparency	in	the	structures	and	processes	of	the	rating	system	is	
matched	by	a	similar	lack	of	transparency	in	its	legitimation.	The	rating	of	educational	
institutions,	for	example,	is	clearly	a	matter	of	public	concern	yet	it	is	predominantly	
																																								 																					
8	But	the	counter-trend,	as	 in	TripAdvisor,	 towards	user-based	reviews,	where	giving	up	control	
of	the	sources	is	the	source	of	credibility	(Jeacle	and	Carter	2011),	keeps	evaluation	criteria	just	
as	obscure.	
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conducted	by	for-profit	private	rating	organizations	based	in	the	media	world	with	
dubious	academic	legitimacy.	This	situation	is	especially	troubling	in	fields	where	rating	
and	ranking	organizations	have	emerged	in	recent	decades	as	new	regulatory	actors	with	
considerable	power	(Cooley	and	Snyder	2015).	In	the	financial	sector,	for	example,	since	
the	Basel	2	Agreement	the	assessment	of	credit	risk	used	to	calculate	minimum	capital	
requirements	for	banks	is	to	be	carried	out	by	acknowledged	financial	ratings	agencies	
(Partnoy	2002;	White	2002).	These	agencies	produce	a	public	good,	yet	their	operation	
as	private	entities	is	largely	protected	from	the	gaze	of	the	public.	They	have	not	been	
elected,	were	not	chosen,	were	not	even	nominated,	and	their	legitimacy	remains	
intransparent,	outside	the	codified	procedures	of	public	debate.		
	 This	lack	of	transparency	is	even	more	suspect	because	of	the	peculiar	
dependencies	linking	rating	organizations	to	the	rated	entities.	In	many	cases	the	
evaluators	are	tied	to	the	evaluated.	These	links	are	sometime	direct	as,	for	example,	
with	the	financial	ratings	agencies	whose	work	is	paid	and	judgments	are	purchased	by	
the	rated	entities.	Often,	these	links	are	indirect,	as	when	evaluators	and	evaluated	come	
from	the	same	milieu	(restaurant	reviewers	know	the	chefs,	wine	raters	have	long-
standing	ties	to	vintners,	and	so	on).	Moreover	in	complex	situations,	such	as	the	current	
financial	arena,	raters	inevitably	act	as	consultants	and	affect	firms'	decisions,	indicating	
for	example	how	they	would	rate	them	if	re-organized	in	particular	ways	(Sinclair	2010:	
8).	How	can	we	trust	the	neutrality	of	their	judgment?	
3.	Ratings	and	rankings	fail	as	forecast		
	 Ratings	are	frequently	consulted	in	hopes	of	obtaining	a	description	of	the	world	
that	lies	ahead.	But,	as	Yogi	Berra	noted,	“It’s	tough	to	make	predictions,	especially	about	
the	future.”	The	future	predicted	by	the	rating	can	be	observed	only	ex-post,	and	in	
social	life	the	problem	becomes	even	more	complicated	because	even	in	retrospect	one	
cannot	know	whether	success	or	failure	really	indicate	that	the	assessment	was	correct	
or	false.	Was	the	rating	confirmed	because	it	was	an	accurate	judgment	or	because	the	
object	adjusted	to	the	evaluation	(e.g.,	markets	modified	as	a	result	of	the	information	
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provided	by	ratings)?9	If	the	prediction	failed,	was	it	because	it	was	wrong	or	because,	
being	correct	and	credible,	it	was	followed	by	everyone,	thereby	changing	the	conditions	
of	the	world	(the	excellent	family	restaurant	became	mediocre	and	standardized	as	a	
consequence	of	the	recommendation	in	the	guide)?		
	 For	these	and	other	reasons	some	critics	suggest	that	in	social	life	ratings	have	
little	informational	value	about	the	future	and,	in	fact,	that	it	is	difficult	to	figure	out	if	
and	how	they	have	any	informational	value	at	all.	Rating	assessments	notoriously	lag	
behind.	Ratings	often	retrospectively	model	what	has	already	happened	(Cooley	and	
Snyder	2015)	and	construct	an	image	of	the	future	that	is	merely	a	forward	projection	of	
data	from	the	past.	Financial	ratings	run	after	the	market,	which	anticipates	the	majority	
of	changes	in	ratings	(Partnoy	2002).	Research	shows	that	sovereign	credit	ratings	
systematically	fail	to	anticipate	crises	in	emerging	countries	(Reinhart	2002).	The	
measures	ratify	the	changes	already	underway	and	produce	pro-cyclical	trends.		
	 The	future	is	made	of	surprises,	but	the	data	available	in	the	present	allow	at	best	
to	protect	against	expected	surprises.	Yet	in	social	situations	it	is	the	unexpected	
surprises	(the	low	frequency	high	impact	events)	–	which	cannot	be	derived	from	current	
trends	–	that	are	the	really	interesting	ones.	A	financial	analyst	would	like	to	know	which	
unpredicted	event	can	endanger	the	reserve	capital	of	the	bank;	a	future	student	would	
like	to	know	which	skills	will	boom	on	the	future	labor	market,	i.e.,	not	the	ones	already	
emerging	today.	But	this	is	precisely	the	information	that	ratings	are	not	able	to	provide.	
4.	Ratings	and	rankings	are	not	objective	
	 Ratings,	goes	the	prevalent	view,	should	provide	objective	information,	available	
for	everyone	regardless	of	the	point	of	view	and	the	interests	of	the	observer.	The	more	
objective,	the	better	they	can	fulfill	their	informational	function.	Their	function	is	to	
overcome	the	obstacles	standing	between	the	user	and	the	necessary	information	in	the	
proper	form	useful	to	make	a	decision.	Such	obstacles	can	be	information	asymmetries	
that	block	the	user	(as	outsider)	from	essential	insider	knowledge	or	lack	of	time	and	
competence	to	adequately	evaluate	available	information.																																										 																					
9	Ratings	tend	to	activate	a	process	of	reactivity	whereby	the	evaluated	institution	(law	schools,	
for	example)	adjust	their	practices	to	conform	to	the	criteria	of	the	rating	agencies	(Espeland	and	
Sauder	2007:		6ff.;	2016,	ch.2).	
	 10	
	 Critics	claim,	however,	that	when	ratings	are	subjected	to	scrutiny,	one	quickly	
discovers	that	their	judgments	lack	objectivity.	As	evidence	for	the	lack	of	objectivity,	
critics	point	to	the	fact	that	movements	in	placements	on	the	lists	of	rankings	
inexplicably	change	too	quickly.	As	such	a	case,	given	the	stickiness	and	complexity	of	
metropolitan	transformations,	how	can	a	city	like	Los	Angeles	move	in	a	single	year	from	
10th	to	17th	place	on	a	ranking	of	cities	(Kornberger	and	Carter	2010:	338)?	It	is	
implausible	that	the	quality	of	life	in	Los	Angeles	could	be	altered	so	much	from	one	year	
to	the	next.	But,	for	other	critics,	it	is	instead	the	lack	of	change	that	indicates	the	
presence	of	bias.	Stickiness	in	this	case	affects	the	placement	in	the	rankings,	with	the	
entities	at	the	top	keeping	their	positions	over	time,	even	if	the	world,	the	criteria	and	
the	evaluation	methods	change	(Schulz	et	al.	2001).	In	the	1999-2006	list	of	US	News	and	
World	Report	top	50	universities	47	institutions	were	always	present,	while	Harvard,	
Princeton,	Stanford	and	Yale	were	in	the	top	five	throughout	(Grewal	et	al.	2008).	Can	
such	a	rigid	classification	be	trusted?	
When	prompted	to	defend	their	objectivity,	evaluators	attempt	to	dispel	any	idea	
that	their	work	is	judgmental	or	arbitrary;	and	they	are	quick	to	claim	that	they	follow	
standardized	and	tightly	regulated	processes	(Pollock	and	D'Adderio	2012:	575).10	But	in	
the	world	of	ratings,	as	in	any	domain	of	social	life,	reliability	(in	the	sense	of	
commitment	to	procedures	and	compliance	with	rules)	does	not	imply	general	validity	
(Cooley	and	Snyder	2015).	Take,	for	example,	the	status	of	“friendly”	or	“affordable”	in	
the	evaluation	of	cities,	or	“courtesy”	and	“elegance”	in	restaurants.	These	and	similar	
notions	inevitably	depend	on	the	perspective	of	the	group	of	persons	the	rating	intends	
to	address.	And	even	when	they	intend	to	measure	objective	characteristics,	such	as	the	
"locational	advantages"	offered	by	large	cities	for	those	in	business	(e.g.,	the	number	of	
MBA	programs,	Google	hits,	patent	applications,	daily	newspapers,	and	the	like),	the	
indicators	depend	on	a	choice	of	the	evaluator,	and	do	not	necessarily	actually	measure	
the	entity	you	want	to	know.	The	indices,	on	the	whole,	rather	than	on	the	world	they	
should	measure	inform	on	those	who	measure	and	on	those	who	are	measured	–	on	how																																									 																					
10	Rating	 agencies	 themselves	 emphatically	 repeat	 that	 they	 offer	 are	 no	 statements	 of	 fact	
(Langohr	 and	 Langohr	 2008:	 17,	 474)	 –	 but	 also	 claim	 rather	 contradictorily	 that	 they	 offer	
opinions	 that	“objectively	measure	the	credit	 risk	of	 the	 issuers	business	and	 its	debt	 financing	
and	resolve	information	asymmetry	about	it”	(89).	
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they	operate	and	how	they	react	to	the	measurement	(Kornberger	and	Carter	2010:	
335ff.).	
	
RANKIIGS	AS	REFERENCE	POINTS	IN	A	WORLD	OF	UNCERTAINTY	
	 Ratings	and	rankings,	critics	contend	and	we	agree,	are	simplistic,	obscurantist,	
inaccurate,	and	subjective.	Unfaithful	to	their	promise	as	neutral	sources	of	valuable	
information,	they	nonetheless	circulate	in	widening	spheres	and	proliferate	in	increasing	
numbers.	Untrusted,	they	are	nevertheless	consulted.	Whether	we	pay	for	them	with	our	
money	or,	when	freely	available,	pay	for	them	with	our	allocated	time,	we	pay	attention.		
	 To	understand	why	we	pay	attention	–	that	is,	to	grasp	the	role	and	functioning	of	
ratings	and	rankings	–	we	will	need	to	change	perspective,	starting	from	assumptions	
about	the	challenges	facing	the	consumer	or	decision	maker	who	consults	a	ranking.	By	
one	way	of	thinking,	the	user	seeks	information	about	the	qualities	of	the	products,	
services,	or	institutions	being	considered.	In	a	world	in	which	more	and	more	options	are	
competing	along	more	and	more	dimensions,	how	to	decide	which	is	the	more	valuable?	
The	ranking,	so	it	would	seem,	offers	such	information	in	a	straightforward	format.	And	
the	better	it	represents	the	underlying	reality	and	the	better	it	demarcates	the	more	
valuable	from	the	less	valuable,	the	more	valuable	it	is	to	the	decision-making	user.		
	 The	problem	with	this	view	it	that	it	vastly	underestimates	the	complexity	of	the	
observational	character	of	the	problem	of	“what’s	valuable?”	in	our	data-rich	society.	
Complexity	means	that	there	are	more	possibilities	than	can	be	taken	into	account,	and	
that	you	know	it	(Morin	1985;	Luhmann	1984:	45	ff.).	Any	data	could	be	connected	with	
other	data,	and	could	thereby	look	different	–	whether	by	someone	else	somewhere	else	
who	is	dealing	with	it	in	another	way	or	by	us	ourselves	in	the	future.	Complexity	
dramatically	increases	contingency	(the	possibility	to	be	otherwise).	It	amplifies	
uncertainty	and	compounds	the	difficulty	of	making	decisions.	How	do	I	decide	that	the	
available	information	is	reliable	if	the	more	I	collect	information	the	more	this	
inadequacy	will	be	obvious	to	me?	And	how	do	I	decide,	knowing	that	important	
information	will	be	produced	as	a	result	of	my	decision	and	therefore	cannot	be	known	
before	I	act?	Nevertheless	I	must	decide,	because	not	deciding	also	has	consequences.	
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	 These	are	the	typical	dilemmas	of	our	risk	society	(Beck	1986;	Luhmann	1991),	
which	do	not	only	affect	big	public	choices	(nuclear	power,	genetically	modified	
organisms,	global	pollution)	but	also	small	and	middle	range	daily	decisions:	to	which	
school	should	I	enroll	my	children,	how	do	I	organize	my	pension	plan,	which	wine	should	
I	buy	for	a	dinner	with	my	colleagues?	In	all	these	cases	we	do	not	have	all	the	
information	necessary	to	decide	with	certainty,	first	because	this	information	depends	
on	what	others	think	and	do:	the	right	school	is	the	one	whose	name	will	be	best	
evaluated	by	employers,	the	right	wine	is	the	one	that	will	make	a	good	impression	on	
my	guests.		
This	is	particularly	elusive	because	the	others	also	observe,	and	what	they	
observe	depends	in	turn	on	what	I	and	the	other	observers	do.	This	inevitable	circularity	
makes	the	issue	unstable	and	difficult	to	manage.	This	circularity	creeps	in	even	in	the	
most	personal	aspects	as	taste,	for	example	in	the	by	now	extremely	complex	selection	
of	quality	wines.	In	front	of	the	multiplicity	of	skills	that	one	should	have,	often	the	wine	
that	we	know	to	be	considered	the	best	is	the	one	we	like	best:	taste	is	the	consequence,	
not	the	premise	of	the	evaluation	(Hennion	2015;		Karpik	2007:	302).	Of	course	we	can	
always	disagree,	but	in	order	to	do	it	we	must	have	an	orientation	–	we	must	disagree	
with	something	(Chauvin	2014).	
	 How	do	ratings	and	rankings	facilitate	action	amidst	such	circuits	of	uncertainty?	
We	claim	that	they	are	effective	under	conditions	of	high	complexity	because	they	shift	
the	reference	from	the	world	to	observers	–	i.e.,	from	first-order	observation	to	second-
order	observation.	The	distinction	of	first-order	and	second-order	observation	has	been	
introduced	by	Heinz	von	Foerster	(1981)	to	distinguish	the	condition	in	which	observers	
focus	on	objective	data	from	the	one	in	which	they	turn	to	the	perspective	of	other	
observers.	As	von	Foerster	argues,	in	the	shift	to	second-order	observation	reality	does	
not	disappear,	but	does	not	coincide	with	objectivity	any	more.	Reality	is	not	the	starting	
point,	it	is	the	result	of	observation,	produced	by	the	reciprocal	reference	of	observers	to	
the	perspective	of	others.	This	is	the	most	reliable	reference	in	a	world	that	has	become	
too	complex	for	univocal	determinations.	Even	if	not	objective,	this	multiple	reality	is	by	
no	means	arbitrary.	What	observers	observe	is	contingent	(in	the	sense	that	it	would	be	
different	from	another	perspective)	but	cannot	be	changed	at	will.	Once	a	reference	has	
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been	chosen	and	shared,	the	perspective	is	binding,	effectively	excluding	any	
arbitrariness.		
	 Second-order	observation	does	not	imply	knowing	what	relevant	others	are	
thinking.	This	is	an	impossible	fantasy,	only	increasing	uncertainty.	Bypassing	this	
uncertainty,	ratings	and	rankings	offer	a	reference	about	which	one	can	be	relatively	
certain.	I	cannot	know	the	thoughts	of	relevant	others,	and	I	cannot	know	all	of	the	data	
and	information	to	which	they	are	exposed,	but	I	can	know	that	there	is	strong	likelihood	
that	others	observe	the	ranking.	I	need	not	trust	in	the	reliability	of	the	ranking	to	have	
reasonable	confidence	that	others	have	consulted	it.	The	ranking	is	an	opinion;	but	not	
just	any	old	opinion.	It	is	one	that	I	pay	attention	to	because	others	pay	attention	to	it.	
Rankings	are	important	because	people	consider	them	important,	and	everyone	knows	
it.		
		 The	“opinion”	of	the	ranking	is	an	opinion	that	everyone	observes	and	can	
observe	others	observing.	The	visible	public	character	of	the	ranking	makes	it	a	common	
reference	point	(Langohr	and	Langohr	2008:	474).	We	do	not	need	to	believe	the	facts	of	
the	ranking	to	take	the	ranking	itself	as	a	fact	that	exists	on	the	social	landscape.11	
However	untrustworthy,	as	a	common	reference	the	ranking	is	a	point	of	orientation	
from	which	to	navigate	an	otherwise	uncertain	decision	space.12		
	 We	do	not	claim	that	rankings	solve	the	challenges	of	making	decisions	in	a	world	
of	second-order	observations.	Our	task	is	to	understand	the	success	of	rankings	as	a	
social	form,	not	to	assess	whether	rankings	help	users	succeed	in	making	better	
decisions.	A	ranking	is	successful	if	it	is	taken	as	a	reference	for	decisions,	which	can	
themselves	be	successful	or	not.	In	light	of	our	general	argument,	we	now	turn	to	the	4																																									 																					
11	The	para-objectivity	of	ratings	(the	reason	why	they	are	treated	“as	if	they	were	facts”)	relies	
basically	on	this	public	character:	they	hold	as	a	reference	as	far	and	as	long	as	others	take	them	
as	a	reference	(trusting	them	or	not)	(Power	1997:	175).	There	is	no	need	of	objectivity	to	carry	
out	 this	 function:	 you	 just	 need	 a	 reference	 that	 holds	 as	 "common	 standard"	 (Langohr	 and	
Langohr	2008:	90)	and	is	recognized	as	such.	"What	is	central	to	the	status	and	consequentiality	
of	rating	agencies	is	what	people	believe	about	them,	and	they	act	on	collectively	–	even	if	those	
beliefs	are	clearly	false"	(Sinclair	2010:	5).	
12	Highly	 visible,	 Robert	 Parker’s	 wine	 scores	 are	 an	 essential	 reference	 for	 everyone	 in	 the	 world	 of	
Bordeaux	wines,	even	for	those	who	do	not	agree	with	his	judgment	but	must	decide	the	price	of	the	wine	
or	plan	purchases	for	the	following	year	(Chauvin	2014).	
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dimensions	of	the	criticism	of	ratings	from	the	perspective	of	second-order	observation.	
From	this	point	of	view,	that	they	are	unreliable	as	descriptions	of	independent	objects	is	
irrelevant.	Their	function	is	different	and	should	be	analyzed	from	another	perspective,	
which	would	also	be	the	starting	point	for	incisive	critique.	As	we	shall	argue,	the	same	
factors	for	which	ratings	are	criticized	appear,	from	this	perspective,	as	the	determinants	
of	their	problematic	effectiveness.	
1.	Ratings	and	rankings	simplify		
	 Recall	that	critics	berate	rankings	as	quantified	and	one-dimensional,	expressing	
evaluation	in	the	form	of	a	number	that	has	a	value	only	inside	this	ordering,	lower	or	
higher	than	those	above	or	below.	Such	quantification	simplifies	and	decontextualizes	
information,	erasing	all	qualitative	nuances.	
	 In	a	complex	world	of	second-order	observations,	however,	this	brutal	
simplification	is	necessary	to	bring	information	to	a	form	in	which	it	can	offer	guidance.	
That	numbers	are	decontextualised	and	depersonalized	has	the	big	advantage	that	they	
are	easy	to	export	and	to	make	public	(Espeland	and	Sauder	2007:	16ff.;	2016:	11).	They	
work	for	everyone,	with	no	need	to	know	where	the	receiver	is	located	and	what	she	
thinks	(Jeacle	and	Carter	2001:	300;	Chauvin	2014:	33).	Everyone	will	be	free	to	
recontextualize	them	as	one	prefers,	and	their	ordering	value	does	not	get	lost.	
Numerical	rank	takes	advantage	of	the	fact	that	we	tend	to	assume	that	the	meaning	of	
numbers	is	universal	and	stable,	independent	from	interpretation.	Thereby,	it	holds	for	
all	observers	regardless	of	their	perspective,	with	the	additional	implication	that,	
observing	the	ordering,	you	know	what	the	others	can	know,	even	if	you	don’t	know	
what	they	think	or	how	they	reason.	In	the	recontextualization	everyone	will	then	
produce	his	own	meanings,	but	you	don't	need	to	know	them	for	the	ordering	to	work.	
And	there	is	no	need	to	reconstruct	the	perspective	of	the	issuer	in	order	to	use	the	
ordering.	Therefore	the	organization	in	ordered	lists	is	easy	to	write	and	easy	to	read.13	
The	users	read	the	ordering	as	they	want	and	use	it	as	they	want,	stopping	when	it	suits	
them	and	freely	building	their	own	interpretations.		
																																								 																					
13	Poole	(2013)	attributes	to	this	ease	the	rampant	success	of	listicles,	web	articles	presented	in	
the	form	of	a	list.		
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	 Quantification	is	also	criticized	because	it	does	not	refer	to	the	quality	of	the	
objects	–	but	this	again	has	advantages:	it	makes	quantification	compatible	with	
irreducible	singularity	of	the	listed	items.	As	Simmel	(2004:	221)	observed,	money	does	
the	same,	expressing	the	value	of	each	object	with	a	number	(its	price)	and	making	it	
comparable	with	every	other	object,	regardless	of	its	quality,	its	emotional	value,	and	its	
position	on	the	market.	The	price	does	not	take	into	account	the	fact	that	the	money	was	
won	in	gambling	or	was	a	gift	from	the	grandparents,	that	the	object	is	mass-produced	or	
handmade,	or	that	it	can	be	bought	on	the	market	or,	as	the	family	jewels,	is	not	for	sale.	
Numbers	unite	and	separate:	each	object	expressed	in	numerical	form	is	comparable	to	
any	other,	but	it	is	also	different	(bigger	or	smaller)	from	any	other	object.		
	 The	ordered	list	is	a	highly	fungible	and	flexible	form	of	organization.	Rankings	
work	because	they	can	compare	their	objects	without	making	them	strictly	
commensurable	(Stark	2011:	321),	i.e.,	without	claiming	to	coordinate	the	perspectives	
of	the	observers,	which	remain	inaccessible.		
2.	Ratings	and	rankings	are	intransparent		
Ratings	are	black	boxes:	their	structure,	criteria,	algorithms,	and	procedures	are	
confidential,	hidden	to	the	view	and	the	intervention	of	the	public.	In	all	fields	in	which	
they	operate,	the	power	of	ratings	grows	together	with	their	obscurity.	This	
intransparency	is	suspect	because	it	suggests	that	something	shady	is	intentionally	
concealed.	But	would	genuine	transparency	be	possible?	And	would	it	be	desirable?	
In	a	world	of	second-order	observation,	an	increase	in	transparency	is	often	no	
advantage.	In	auditing,	efficient	evaluation	requires	a	"substantial	darkness"	and	a	
certain	degree	of	imprecision	about	the	purposes	and	meanings	of	the	enterprise	(Power	
1997:	16).	The	decisions	underlying	the	evaluation	could	always	be	different.	
Transparency	highlights	first	of	all	this	contingency,	and	in	many	cases	the	spread	of	
information	undermines	the	trust	necessary	for	the	functioning	of	rating	organizations,	
thereby	increasing	conflicts.	More	transparency	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	better	
decisions;	instead,	it	generates	a	situation	where	informed	observers	can	lose	trust	in	the	
decision	makers,	who	then	have	less	authority	to	make	good	decisions	(Tsoukas	1997:	
840;	Strathern	2000).	The	spread	of	information,	moreover,	has	self-referential	effects	
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that	produce	further	complexity.	As	shown	in	the	discussion	about	reactivity	(Espeland	
and	Sauder	2016),	the	rated	entities	observe	the	rating	and	its	criteria	and	change	
accordingly	-	becoming	more	and	more	intransparent.	
	 On	the	other	hand,	in	a	complex	world	of	observers	who	observe	each	other	and	
know	that	they	are	being	observed,	also	the	dependence	of	the	evaluators	from	the	
evaluated	(producing	the	widespread	mistrust	in	judges	who	are	paid	by	the	judged)	has	
advantages.14	If	genuine	transparency	is	neither	possible	nor	desirable,	the	form	of	
transparency	offered	by	ratings	can	become	an	element	of	self-branding	of	an	
institution.	Requiring	to	be	evaluated	and	willing	to	pay	for	it,	an	institution	shows	that	it	
accepts	the	principle	of	transparency	,and	this	very	willingness	becomes	an	element	of	its	
reputation	(Cooley	and	Snyder	2015).	A	university	exposing	itself	to	the	ranking	fosters	a	
specific	connotation	of	its	image,	as	a	college	open	to	competition	and	observable	in	this	
way.	You	can	do	otherwise,	but	you	must	find	an	alternative	way	to	manage	the	demand	
for	transparency,	and	it	is	not	easy.	
	
3.	Ratings	and	rankings	fail	as	forecast		
Ratings	do	not	accurately	describe	the	future.	They	often	fail	their	predictions,	lag	
behind,	and	are	not	able	to	anticipate	rare	events	and	surprises.	The	unreliability	of	
ratings,	however,	is	the	flip	side	of	their	effectiveness:	they	cannot	predict	the	future	
because,	paradoxically,	they	actively	contribute	to	shaping	it.	
Fallibility	is	inevitable	for	all	measures	expected	to	provide	an	orientation	with	
respect	to	the	social	future,	which	should	protect	from	surprises	(Merton	1936).	Ratings	
should	facilitate	the	choice	of	a	University,	referring	to	the	state	of	the	world	and	to	job	
opportunities	3	or	5	years	after	the	date	of	the	decision.	But	it	is	meaningless	to	expect	
that	ratings,	like	any	other	measure,	can	describe	our	social	future,	because	that	future	
does	not	exist	yet	and	will	be	produced	also	as	a	result	of	our	present	action,	oriented	by	
ratings.	If	everyone	follows	the	ratings	and	chooses	the	study	promising	better	chances	
of	finding	a	job,	at	the	end	of	the	course	the	market	will	be	saturated.																																										 																					
14	A	student,	paying	the	tuition	fees	of	his	university,	indirectly	pays	to	be	evaluated	and	to	get	a	
degree	that	will	become	part	of	his	public	image	-	but	this	does	not	usually	leads	to	question	the	
legitimacy	of	the	teachers	to	grade	him.	
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	 The	future	following	our	actions	cannon	be	known	in	advance,	and	happens	with	
or	without	our	predictions;	but	if	we	did	nothing	to	anticipate	or	produce	it,	surprises	
would	simply	be	puzzles.	In	conditions	of	absolute	uncertainty	one	cannot	decide.	But	
since	the	observers	are	part	of	the	world	they	describe,	the	uncertainty	they	must	
manage	is	not	absolute.	They	operate	under	conditions	of	"bounded	uncertainty”	
(Shackle	1990:	28-48),	facing	a	future	that	is	unknown	but	bound	by	present	decisions,	a	
future	open	but	not	random.	Of	the	open	future	we	can	know	that	it	depends	on	what	
we	do,	even	if	we	do	not	know	how.		
	 Ratings	deal	with	this	uncertainty.	A	decision	is	motivated	not	if	it	correctly	
anticipates	the	future	(this	can	be	the	case	of	not)	but	if	it	is	guided	by	recognizable	
criteria	that	make	it	not	arbitrary.	The	future	depends	on	our	decisions,	even	when	it	
deviates	from	our	expectations	and	appears	as	a	surprise.	The	future	is	not	bound	by	our	
expectations,	but	if	we	didn’t	have	them	or	had	other	expectations	it	would	come	about	
differently.	The	evolution	of	markets	often	does	not	match	the	predictions	of	financial	
ratings,	but	this	happens	because	ratings	have	been	produced	and	circulated,	changing	
the	structure	of	markets.	Different	ratings	would	have	produced	different	markets,	not	
necessarily	confirming	the	ratings.15	
	 Ratings	offer	a	compass	not	because	they	make	it	possible	to	know	how	things	
will	be	but	because	they	offer	a	standpoint	so	one	will	not	drift	aimlessly.	If	you	have	a	
financial	model,	for	example,	you	can	observe	how	markets	deviated	from	it	and	learn	
from	experience.	By	giving	shape	to	our	expectations	about	the	future,	ratings	provide	a	
yardstick	against	which	we	can	adjust	our	expectations.		
4.	Ratings	and	rankings	are	not	objective	
	 Ratings	are	criticized	for	not	being	neutral	observations.	They	describe	the	world	
from	their	perspective,	not	an	independent	world.	Ratings	offer	opinions	among	the																																									 																					
15	Under	the	 label	of	performativity,	such	circular	effects	are	the	object	of	 intensive	research	 in	
economics:	 cf.	 MacKenzie	 2006;	 at	 al.	 2007;	 Esposito	 2013.	 The	 much	 discussed	 reactivity	 of	
ratings	 is	 itself	 a	 case	 of	 performativity,	 which	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 basic	 condition	 that	 observers	
belong	 to	 the	 world	 they	 observe.	 Financial	 models	 are	 performative	 because	 they	 do	 not	
observe	 the	world	 from	 outside.	 As	 Austin	 first	 highlighted	 in	 “How	 to	 do	 things	with	words”	
(1962)	 for	 the	use	of	 language,	performativity	arises	because	utterances	do	not	only	 represent	
the	world,	they	act	on	the	world.	Performative	utterances	are	facts	and	have	consequences.		
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others,	not	facts,	and	therefore	do	not	seem	able	to	provide	the	desired	independent	
reference.	Opinions	are	always	contingent,	i.e.,	they	could	be	different.	How	can	you	rely	
on	them	and	exclude	arbitrariness?	
	 But	the	contingency	of	ratings	is	actually	a	condition	for	their	efficient	
functioning.	Ratings	do	not	describe;	they	(performatively)	intervene,	and	thereby	bind	
themselves.	Rating	practices	realize	a	sort	of	neutralization	of	subjective	elements	-	not	a	
cancellation,	since	the	judgments	remain	subjective,	but	a	condition	which	effectively	
excludes	arbitrariness.	Lamont’s	study	of	scientific	reviews,	for	example,	shows	that	
evaluators	almost	always	perceive	the	procedures	as	fair,	selecting	the	best	candidates	–	
not	in	spite	of	subjective	elements,	but	precisely	because	of	them:	“Evaluation	would	be	
impossible	without	extra-cognitive	elements”	(Lamont	2009:	19;	also	Kieser	2010).	Once	
initiated,	the	process	binds	itself	and	gains	the	necessary	legitimacy	that	does	not	derive	
from	the	objectivity	of	the	judgment	(which	is	always	debatable)	but	from	the	process	
itself.		
	 Kreiner	(2012)	shows	that	the	criteria	that	make	the	evaluations	in	architectural	
competitions	binding	and	not	arbitrary	arise	during	the	proceedings	and	cannot	be	
established	in	advance.	They	cannot	be	objective	and	univocal,	because	this	would	
unduly	bind	the	development	of	the	procedure.	Thus,	the	criteria	stated	at	the	beginning	
will	be	empty	and	generic.	The	competition	brief	that	initiates	the	procedure	is	utterly	
vague	in	order	to	allow	the	competitors	to	interpret	it	each	in	their	own	way	as	they	
develop	their	projects.	In	the	course	of	the	evaluation	a	project	emerges	as	the	winner.	
And	it	is	this	project	that	becomes	the	point	of	reference	for	clarifying	the	winning	
criteria,	thereby	retrospectively	solving	the	ambiguity	of	the	starting	point.	The	choice	at	
this	point	become	motivated	and	almost	necessary:	the	winning	project	is	the	one	that	
best	meets	the	requirements	of	the	call,	which	are	now	clear	and	defined.16		
																																								 																					
16	Schulz	et	al.	2001:	37	attribute	to	a	similar	effect	the	stickiness	of	rankings.	Under	conditions	of	
high	 complexity	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 understand	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 individual	
cases,	and	the	items	at	the	top	become	the	reference	for	setting	the	criteria	of	 judgment	-	and	
then	 they	 tend	 to	 remain	 at	 the	 top	 also	 when	 the	 criteria	 change.	 In	 university	 rankings,	
therefore,	Harvard,	Princeton,	Stanford	and	Yale	are	always	in	the	top	five	because	they	set	the	
standard	the	ranking	refers	to.		
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	 In	an	enormously	complex	world,	with	different	contexts	and	different	
perspectives,	objectivity	becomes	impossible	and	would	not	even	be	convenient.	If	
objectivity	requires	being	the	same	to	all	observers	at	all	times	and	in	all	circumstances,	
the	claim	of	objectivity	would	become	an	unbearable	burden,	since	circumstances	and	
moments	are	always	different	and	essentially	unpredictable.	Contingency	means	the	
ability	to	adapt	to	the	context	-	but	does	not	mean	lack	of	control.	Ratings	and	raters	
follow	shared	and	controlled	procedures,	which	make	the	result,	although	not	
predictable	a	priori,	anything	but	arbitrary.	It	could	have	been	different,	but	given	the	
procedure	and	the	specific	circumstances,	it	emerges	as	correct	for	all	participants	and	
can	no	longer	be	changed.	This	allows	ratings	to	perform	the	task	for	which	objectivity	is	
usually	required:	to	serve	as	a	common	reference	for	all	observers	(but	with	much	higher	
flexibility).	
CONCLUSION:	FROM	THE	RANKED	SOCIETY	TO	THE	SOCIETY	OF	RANKINGS	?	
	 The	processions	of	medieval	Europe	enacted	the	ranked	orders	of	feudal	society.	
Within	each	order,	feudal	society	paraded	in	ranks.	Among	the	clergy:	cardinals,	
archbishops,	bishops,	priests;	among	the	nobility:	lords,	barons,	knights,	squires;	among	
the	laborers:	freemen,	yeomen,	servants,	serfs	(in	the	rural	areas)	and	the	ranked	order	
of	crafts	(in	the	towns)	(Duby	1980:	74,	171:	Hilton	1992).	Today’s	processions	scroll	past	
on	screens:	Google	page	ranks,	Top	10	and	Top	100	Lists,	and	the	other	ratings	and	
rankings	that	we	have	argued	are	the	guides	to	navigate	the	uncertainties	of	our	
relationship	with	the	world,	with	society,	and	with	ourselves.	The	two	types	of	
processions,	of	course,	could	not	be	more	different.	But	yet	they	bear	a	similarity	
because	each	type	of	ordering	provides	answers	(in	an	entirely	different	modality)	to	the	
fundamental	questions	of	the	order	of	society	and	of	one’s	standing.		
	 The	social	hierarchies	of	ancient	and	medieval	societies,	ranked	from	the	
monarch	to	nobles	to	the	lower	classes	down	to	the	serfs	and	slaves,	appeared	as	the	
only	possible	form	of	order,	corresponding	to	the	general	order	of	the	universe	from	God	
to	the	angels	to	men	to	the	animals	down	to	inanimate	objects	like	stones	(Duby	1980:	
110-19;	Meier	1980).	In	this	sense	hierarchy	was	conceived	as	an	objective	and	
indisputable	disposition,	assigning	to	each	person	one	and	only	one	position	with	
corresponding	moral	qualities	and	social	expectations	(Dumont	1980).	As	in	the	cosmos,	
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where	origin	determined	the	nature	of	things,	so	in	social	life	birth	determined	the	
characteristics	and	opportunities	of	people.	This	disposition	could	not	change,	no	more	
than	the	member	of	a	species	(a	horse)	could	move	to	a	different	species	(a	dog).	
Individuals	could	have	more	or	less	different	behaviors,	but	in	this	view	a	plebeian,	as	
virtuous	and	successful	and	possibly	rich,	could	nonetheless	not	become	a	nobleman	no	
more	than	a	decayed	nobleman	could	become	a	peasant	(Luhmann	1997:	689).	Religious	
and	other	processions	were	a	ritual	and	literal	confirmation	of	one’s	standing	within	such	
a	hierarchical	order.		
	 Where	the	social	order	corresponded	to	the	order	of	the	world,	already	
established	and	known	by	all,	rank	order	was	the	premise	of	observation,	not	its	result.	
There	were	no	rankings	in	a	ranked	society.	The	orderings	of	today,	expressed	in	the	
rankings	of	evaluative	lists,	correspond	to	a	very	different	need.	Modern	society	is	
complex	and	contingent	primarily	because	it	does	not	rely	on	the	assumption	of	a	single	
order,	given	and	shared	by	all.	It	is	a	heterarchical	and	polycentric	society,	in	which	
different	hierarchies	and	orderings	intertwine	and	reproduce,	none	of	which	can	claim	to	
be	dominant,	or	even	to	be	fixed	(Luhmann	1997:	§§	4.8-4.11;	Stark	2009:	204-212).		
	 Rankings,	like	the	institutions	studied	in	François	et	at.	(2014),	are	not	stable	and	
unquestionable	as	the	traditional	rank	hierarchy,	but	are	born	and	die.	Not	all	rankings	
are	successful,	and	even	those	which	do	can	be	replaced	by	other	guidelines.	The	success	
and	ability	of	rankings	to	act	as	a	reference	do	not	depend	as	the	order	of	pre-modern	
societies	on	the	claim	to	correctly	describe	the	world.	Instead,	they	depend	on	the	ability	
to	build	up	a	reference	audience.	One	uses	them	"if	one	is	not	alone	in	doing	so	and	can	
realize	it"	(François	et	al.	2014:	63).		
The	conditions	of	success	of	ratings	are	described	in	Lucien	Karpik’s	study	(2000)	
on	the	Michelin	"red	guide",	which	traces	the	history	of	the	famous	vademecum	
reconstructing	the	transformations	of	its	function.	At	its	beginning	in	1900	it	was	a	
"technical	guide"	offering	practical	objective	information	for	the	journey,	such	as	the	
availability	of	repair	shops	and	service	stations,	the	list	of	doctors,	hotels,	sites	of	cultural	
interest.	The	real	success	of	the	guide,	however,	came	a	few	decades	later,	when	since	
1933	the	guide	provided	an	evaluation	and	a	hierarchy	of	restaurants,	making	choices	
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that	could	be	different	and	can	be	criticized	(also	because	in	the	meantime	competitors	
as	the	Guide	Hachette	began	to	appear).	In	the	following	years	the	guide	became	more	
and	more	contingent	and	subjective,	but	its	success	continued	to	grow.	Karpik	explains	it	
by	referring	to	the	parallel	development	in	France	of	a	public	of	cultured	travelers	and	
gourmeurs,	who	are	trained	on	the	guide	and	constitute	its	audience.	This	public	is	not	
looking	for	objective	information.	In	consulting	the	Michelin	guide,	its	readers	recognize	
themselves	as	belonging	to	the	elite	of	connoisseurs	of	cuisine,	who	share	the	same	
taste,	interests	and	criteria	(labled	a	“likeminded	community”	by	Jeacle	and	Carter	2001:	
300).	In	reading	the	reviews	of	restaurants,	the	users	observe	and	know	the	other	
readers,	and	eventually	themselves	as	belonging	to	this	group.		
This	kind	of	mechanism	is	not	limited	to	gastronomic	guides.	The	authority	and	
authoritativeness	of	rankings	and	guides	increasingly	relies	on	participation	and	not	on	
external	factors	(Shay	and	Pinch	2006).	The	success	of	the	evaluation	process	involves	
the	contemporary	creation	of	an	audience	and	of	the	world	to	be	assessed,	and	in	this	
view	is	by	no	means	arbitrary.	The	judgment	is	correct	because	it	provides	an	adequate	
and	reliable	description	-	not	of	an	objective	world	shared	by	everyone,	but	of	the	
specific	world	created	by	the	rating	and	observed	by	its	observers.	When	a	rating	is	
successful,	its	self-fulfilling	prophecies	become	correct	without	being	"true."17	Who	
reads	the	Michelin	guide	does	not	only	read	what	the	reviewer	who	visited	a	particular	
restaurant	liked	or	not	liked,	but	what	the	whole	community	of	readers	of	the	Michelin	
guide	(to	which	she	himself	belongs)	knows	about	that	restaurant	and	the	general	
opinion	–	she	is	informed	about	the	readers,	not	about	the	reviewer	or	about	the	
restaurant.		
Other	ratings	fail,	not	because	they	were	not	"real"	or	not	"correct,"	but	because	
they	failed	to	attract	the	attention	of	observers	and	to	create	their	own	reference	world.	
Their	arbitrariness	becomes	then	immediately	apparent:	why	should	I	care	for	the	
whimsical	idiosyncratic	opinions	of	a	cookery	enthusiast	rather	than	another?	The	same	
happens	when	an	institution	"dies":	when	a	reference	is	no	longer	able	to	create	its	own	
																																								 																					
17	This	new	field	”is	neither	 true	nor	 false;	 rather,	what	we	call	 ‘truth’	 is	established	within	this	
new	field”(Kornberger	and	Carter	2010:	338).	
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public,	one	goes	back	to	the	"verdict	of	experience"	(Francois	et	al.	2014:	232),	that	is,	to	
first-order	observation.	Observation	returns	to	refer	directly	to	objects.		
	 But	first-order	observation	is	not	enough.	We	live	in	a	world	of	situated	and	
provisional	orders,	that	hold	and	are	not	arbitrary	precisely	because	of	their	contingency.	
This	contingency	also	affects	the	structuring	of	individual	identity.	In	society	and	in	a	
world	that	do	not	have	an	indisputable	and	permanent	order,	also	knowing	who	one	is	
and	how	and	where	one	stands	is	today	perplexing.	Ratings	and	rankings	are	tools	to	get	
an	orientation	in	such	a	world	–	at	a	general	and	at	a	personal	level.	Whereas	the	ratings	
of	Standard	and	Poors	or	the	college	rankings	of	U.S.	News	and	World	Report	are	used	to	
observe	the	world	that	others	observe,	the	numerous	Top	10	or	Top	100	lists	in	cultural	
fields	are	used	for	another	need.	Here	the	observation	of	others	provides	a	reference	
point	to	observe	oneself.		
	 Consider	the	choice	of	a	novel.	Even	when	we	look	for	a	book	for	ourselves,	as	an	
experience	or	as	entertainment,	we	cannot	do	so	without	referring	to	others.	But	we	are	
not	interested	in	just	any	others.	Of	interest	is	a	specific	portion	of	the	public,	namely,	
we	want	to	know	what	appeals	to	people	like	ourselves	–	using	whatever	criteria	we	
recognize	and	refer	to	when	building	our	identity.	Therefore	in	the	cultural	and	
"experiential"	fields	there	are	a	multiplicity	of	different	ratings,	referring	to	different	
portions	of	the	public:	the	ratings	of	the	New	York	Review	of	Books	and	of	the	London	
Review	of	Books	but	also	those	of	the	Jewish	Review	of	Books,	the	Catholic	Review	of	
Books,	Oprah’s	Book	Club	list,	and	yet	ever	more	finely	grained	niche	listings.	These	
ratings	give	an	orientation	not	so	much	to	know	the	world,	as	to	know	oneself	through	
the	experience	of	the	world:	a	given	novel,	but	also	tasting	certain	foods	or	wines	
(Hennion	2015)	serves	at	the	same	time	to	mark	the	membership	in	a	group	and	to	form	
one’s	own	identity	through	this	membership.		
	 As	was	the	case	for	pre-modern	rank	orders,	so	the	order	provided	by	rankings	
seems	to	become	an	indispensable	reference,	even	if	today’s	reference	point	is	always	
changing,	must	continually	be	updated,	and	contributes	to	rather	than	eliminates	
uncertainty	and	anxiety.	As	we	saw,	ratings	and	rankings	base	their	credibility	on	their	
ability	to	manage	and	use	contingency,	thereby	orienting	second-order	observation.	The	
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ordering	they	produce	is	not	(or	should	not	be)	arbitrary,	even	if	it	depends	on	
circumstances	and	is	generated	together	with	them.	The	order	of	the	ranking	helps	then	
to	organize	the	world,	the	relationships	with	others	and	with	things.	It	also	helps	to	
observe	oneself.	While	the	pre-modern	person	always	knew	who	he/she	was	and	what	
his/her	place	was,	privileged	or	not,	in	our	society	identity	is	increasingly	mobile	and	
negotiated,	a	source	of	ambitions	and	frustrations.	And	above	all,	it	must	always	be	
confirmed.		
	 Gary	Shteyngart’s	novel,	Super	Sad	True	Love	Story	(2011)	radicalizes	this	
condition	describing	a	world	in	which	everyone	is	wearing	a	device	(an	äppärät)	
continuously	producing	a	rating	that	can	also	be	read	by	others.	In	this	society	of	
rankings,	the	rating	is	crucial	for	constructing	a	reference	point,	revealed	when	the	crisis	
that	closes	the	novel	renders	the	äppärät	useless.	Without	the	guidance	provided	by	the	
rankings,	young	people	are	caught	in	the	grip	of	a	modern	form	of	deep	anomie,	some	
even	committing	suicide.	As	Shteyngart’s	narrator,	Louie,	observed	about	one	of	these	
young	suicides:	"One	wrote,	quite	eloquently,	about	how	he	‘reached	out	to	life,’	but	
found	there	only	‘walls	and	thoughts	and	faces,’	which	weren’t	enough.	He	needed	to	be	
ranked,	to	know	his	place	in	this	world”	(Shteyngart	2011:	270).	The	world	"out	there"	
offers	objects	(walls),	discourses	(thoughts),	and	relationships	with	others	(faces),	which	
are	not	enough	as	long	as	they	remain	references	for	first-order	observation.	Only	at	the	
second-order	do	they	become	significant	for	building	identity,	and	for	this	we	now	
apparently	need	ratings	and	rankings.	
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